Award details

Development of goal-directed action in young children

Reference	BB/G001057/1
Principal Investigator / Supervisor	Professor Anthony Dickinson
Co-Investigators / Co-Supervisors	Dr James Russell
Institution	University of Cambridge
Department	Psychology
Funding type	Research
Value (£)	256,084
Status	Completed
Type	Research Grant
Start date	01/10/2008
End date	30/09/2011
Duration	36 months

Abstract

Mature goal-directed action depends on the interaction of two types of representation: the first is a representation of the causal or contingent relationship between the action and the outcome, whereas the second is a representation of the current value of the outcome. Within this framework, the canonical behavioural assay for goal-directed behaviour is the outcome devaluation procedure, Recently, we (Klossek, Russell & Dickinson) have used this assay to demonstrate that the instrumental actions of children over 3 yr are goal-directed and mediated by knowledge of the specific action-outcome (A-O) contingencies experienced during training. We found no evidence, however, to suggest that children younger than 2 yr acted on the basis of knowledge of the specific A-O relationships. The aim of the proposal is therefore to investigate the processes that control the instrumental actions of young children between 1 and 4 years in further detail. We will use variations of the outcome devaluation paradigm, A-O contingency manipulations and anticipatory looking measures to assess the extent of A-O learning that takes place at different stages in development. Key variables, such as the amount of exposure to the training contingencies and task complexity, will be analysed to examine the extent to which different training conditions have an impact on the type of process that controls young children's instrumental actions. To investigate the mechanisms of goal-directed action, we will adapt the Pavlovian-instrumental transfer paradigm to determine whether outcome representations can directly prime instrumental action and whether this process mediates goal-directed behaviour. The results of these studies will fill an important gap in our knowledge about the development of intentional and purposive behaviour in young children.

Summary

We all tend to think of our behaviour as being intentional and purposive and that we do things to achieve goals, whether it is working hard to pass an exam or driving a familiar route to work. However, the 'slips-of-action' that we often make show that we can be mistaken in believing that our behaviour is goal-directed. Although we may set out to drive to the station to pick up a friend, before we know it, we might well find ourselves on route to work, especially if we are distracted and not thinking carefully about what we are doing. This is because well-practiced habitual responses, such as driving to work, easily take over control of our behaviour when we come across stimuli that have regularly been associated with the responses in the past. So, when we come to a cross-road, we might turn left (to work) instead of right to the station. This example shows that one and the same action can be controlled by two different systems: a cognitive goal-directed system that depends upon knowing about the consequences or outcomes of our actions and a more simple habit system that just depends upon associating responses directly with stimuli. This distinction raises interesting questions about the development of behavioural control in young children. Is their behaviour initially controlled by the habit system before becoming goal-directed as they get older? One difficulty in answering this question is that, unlike adults, you cannot ask very young children directly about their goals. To overcome this problem, we have developed an outcome devaluation procedure in which the children learn to perform an action in order to see a cartoon. Having learned this action, we then let them look at the cartoon for long enough for them to get bored with it so that it should no longer be valuable for them. When we then give the children a chance to try to work for the now-devalued cartoon again, 3-yr-olds do not do so, thereby showing that their actions are goal-directed. Surprising, however, younger children under 2 yr try to work just as hard for the cartoon whether or not they have become bored with it. This finding raises two questions. First, why did the young children not adapt their behaviour to the change in value of the cartoon outcome? One possibility is that we simply did not give them enough training to learn about the task, whereas another is that the task is just too complicated for them. Therefore, we shall investigate whether young children are goal-directed when they received more training on a simpler task. Another possibility is that they do not realise that their behaviour causes the presentation of the cartoons and so we shall investigate whether 2-yr-olds are sensitive to the whether or not their actions actually produce the cartoons. The second question relates to how goals control behaviour in the older children. One possibility is that imagining a goal automatically triggers actions that in the past have produced the goal. To find out whether this is so, we shall get the children to imagine a particular cartoon have trained them to perform a specific action in order to get this cartoon. Then we shall see whether the thought of the cartoon triggers the appropriate behaviour and whether its ability to do so depends upon the current value of the cartoon for the child. These studies will allow us to discover how young children control their behaviour and determine more precisely at what stage they develop the capacity for goal-directed action. Therefore, they will fill an important gap in our knowledge about what young children do and do not know about the consequences of their own actions at different ages and how this knowledge controls their behaviour.

Committee	Closed Committee - Animal Sciences (AS)
Research Topics	Neuroscience and Behaviour
Research Priority	X – Research Priority information not available
Research Initiative	X - not in an Initiative
Funding Scheme	X – not Funded via a specific Funding Scheme

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